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Bilevel programming approach to demand response management
with day-ahead tariff
Andra´s KOVA´CS1
Abstract This paper introduces a bilevel programming
approach to electricity tariff optimization for the purpose of
demand response management (DRM) in smart grids. In
the multi-follower Stackelberg game model, the leader is
the profit-maximizing electricity retailer, who must set a
time-of-use variable energy tariff in the grid. Followers
correspond to groups of prosumers (simultaneous produc-
ers and consumers of the electricity. They response to the
observed tariff, schedule controllable loads and determine
the charging/discharging policy of their batteries to mini-
mize the cost of electricity and to maximize the utility at
the same time. A bilevel programming formulation of the
problem is defined, and its fundamental properties are
proven. The primal-dual reformulation is proposed in this
paper to convert the bilevel optimization problem into a
single-level quadratically constrained quadratic program
(QCQP), and a successive linear programming (SLP)
algorithm is applied to solve it. It is demonstrated in
computational experiments that the proposed approach
outperforms typical earlier methods based on the Karush–
Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) reformulation regarding both solution
quality and computational efficiency on practically relevant
problem sizes. Besides, it also offers more flexible mod-
eling capabilities.
Keywords Demand response management (DRM), Smart
grid, Game theory, Optimization, Bilevel programming
1 Introduction
A key to the stable operation of future electricity grid is
realizing efficient demand response management (DRM).
With the increasing share of renewables in energy mix, the
production is becoming less and less controllable. At the
same time, electricity consumption is becoming more
controllable due to new types of loads and storage (e.g.,
electric vehicles, home-level or small business energy
management solutions) and various intelligent appliances
at end consumers. As a result, a gradual shift from the
traditional ‘‘supply follows demand’’ paradigm to a new
‘‘demand follows supply’’ approach can be observed. The
critical success factor for efficient DRM is an appropriate
electricity tariff that motivates consumers to schedule their
loads and manage their batteries in such a way that it
contributes to grid stability.
This paper studies the problem of optimizing the elec-
tricity tariff offered by an electricity retailer to its cus-
tomers in a game theoretical setting. A bilevel
programming approach is introduced, where the retailer is
the leader and the groups of end consumers act as multiple
independent followers. The customers are modelled as
‘‘prosumers’’, i.e., simultaneous producers and consumers
of electricity, who look for the best tradeoff between
maximizing their utility and minimizing their cost of
electricity. An effective and computationally efficient
solution method is proposed. The bilevel program is firstly
transformed into an equivalent single-level optimization
problem using a primal-dual reformulation, and then solved
using a successive linear programming (SLP) algorithm.
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After reviewing the related literature in Section 2, a
formal definition of the tariff optimization problem is given
in Section 3. The proposed approach is presented in detail
in Section 4. The approach is illustrated on a small-scale
example and evaluated in thorough computational experi-
ments in Section 5. Finally, conclusions are drawn and
possible directions for future research are suggested.
2 Literature review
2.1 Game-theoretic models for DRM
Game-theoretic models for DRM have received signifi-
cant attention recently [1]. A fundamental classification of
these models differentiates between ‘‘real-time’’ vs. ‘‘day-
ahead’’ approaches. Real-time pricing (RTP) models often
focus on the present time instant only, and ignore the
interdependence between the present energy tariff and past
or future consumption. Accordingly, these models con-
centrate on load curtailment, but fail to capture deferrable
loads appropriately. This limitation can be lifted by
applying multi-period models. Still, most of the earlier
contributions focus on the RTP scenario with a single time
instant: a multi-leader, multi-follower Stackelberg game is
defined for DRM among independent electricity providers
and consumers in [2]. A closed-form analytical solution is
derived, which can be obtained by a distributed algorithm.
The management of consumer-to-grid systems is modelled
as a Stackelberg game in [3], with a central power station
acting as the leader, and consumers as multiple followers.
Embedded into the Stackelberg game, the consumers play a
generalized Nash game to establish their equilibrium
strategies, and hence, to determine their response to the
energy prices offered by the power station. A similar
approach is applied to electric vehicle charging in [4].
Reference [5] investigates DRM on three levels of hierar-
chy (the grid operator, multiple service providers, and the
consumers) with RTP, and proposes a two-loop Stackel-
berg game model. The existence of a unique Stackelberg
equilibrium is proven by exploiting the strictly convex sub-
problems of the individual players, and an iterative dis-
tributed algorithm is proposed for reaching it. A Stackel-
berg approach is investigated for DRM under load
uncertainty in [6]. Again, an analytical solution could be
derived.
Reference [7] studies a Stackelberg game for RTP over
multiple time periods with a profit-maximizing retailer and
a single end consumer who looks for the best tradeoff
between electricity cost and comfort in the heat manage-
ment of a building. The problem is formulated as a bilevel
program, and then converted to and solved as a single-level
mixed-integer linear program (MILP) using the Karush–
Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions. The same paper shows
that while RTP is vastly efficient for load shifting, it can
cause excessive and imponderable payments for small
consumers. Therefore, more predictable day-ahead pricing
schemes are an attractive approach for households.
Despite this, the literature of ‘‘day-ahead’’ tariff opti-
mization models is significantly scarcer. In [8], a Stackel-
berg model is proposed for energy pricing and dispatch in a
multi-period day-ahead setting in two coupled stages. The
first stage addresses price setting subject to demand
response from consumers who minimize their energy cost
and maximize their utility by scheduling their controllable
loads. In the second stage, the retailer establishes the
operation strategy for its storage unit and its energy con-
tracts by solving a robust optimization problem considering
uncertain market prices. The authors transform this prob-
lem into a single-level MILP by exploiting the KKT con-
ditions and duality theory. In [9], a Stackelberg game is
formulated and solved using an iterative heuristic
approach. Two different games related to demand side
management are studied in [10]: a Nash game between
consumers equipped with batteries and a Stackelberg game
between the utility provider and the consumers. A bilevel
programming approach to the operation scheduling of a
distribution network, with a cost-minimizing network
operator as the leader and multiple profit-maximizing
microgrids as followers, is considered in [11]. Again, KKT
reformulation is applied to arrive at a single-level problem.
A sophisticated Stackelberg game model is presented
in [12] to capture the interplay of a retailer (leader) and
various types of distributed energy resources, including
generators and consumers with different types of control-
lable load as well (followers). Again, the problem is con-
verted to a single-level MILP using the KKT
reformulation. A similar problem, with power flow con-
straints and a retailer who also oversees the operation of
distributed generators and batteries, is studied in [13].
2.2 Related problems in energy management
and DRM
The consumers’ (followers’) problem in the above
Stackelberg games corresponds to an energy management
problem for minimizing the cost and maximizing the utility.
Linear programming (LP) models limited to active power
flow equations are commonly used in the literature for
solving this problem [14]. More sophisticated, non-linear
models allow capture reactive power and voltagemagnitudes
as well [15, 16], or describe the behavior of the energy sys-
tem components (battery, or heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning in buildings) in a more realistic way [17].
Obviously, Stackelberg games and bilevel programming
approach are not the only possible approaches to DRM
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problems. Alternative methods are often based on statisti-
cal models of the grid-level load response to the variation
of energy prices [18]. An iterative solution procedure that
alternates between the optimization problems of the con-
sumers (minimizing the cost) and the grid (maximizing the
load factor) is presented in [19] for smart building-to-grid
systems, using a sophisticated thermal model of the
buildings. In [20], the problem of dynamic pricing for
DRM is formulated as a Markov decision process, and
reinforcement learning is used to solve it. In [21], demand
response is modeled by directly quantifying the delay-tol-
erant demand and its dependence on price by linear,
potential, exponential and logarithmic load functions.
Game-theoretic approaches to different, but related
problems in energy management include [22], where a
Stackelberg approach is proposed for achieving a fair
curtailment of renewable energy generation. A Stackelberg
game model is investigated in [23] with a central produc-
tion unit (leader) who sets the electricity price to maximize
its profit subject to the response from an electricity service
provider (follower) that will accept load curtailment and
distributed generation bids from various microgrids in view
of the central producer’s price. A supply-demand game is
investigated in a smart grid setting in [24], with generators
and loads acting as multiple followers, and a data center
server as the virtual leader; a deep transfer Q-learning
algorithm is applied for finding the equilibrium. The opti-
mal operation of multi-carrier energy systems is modelled
as bilevel optimization problem in [25]. The upper level
problem of minimizing the total energy cost and the lower
level problem of minimizing the operation and dissatis-
faction costs are solved through an iterative procedure.
2.3 Mathematical methodology
An introduction to bilevel programming approach,
including basic modelling and solution techniques, is given
in [26, 27]. Approaches to transforming bilevel optimiza-
tion problems into equivalent single-level models, includ-
ing the optimal value or the KKT reformulation, are
studied in [28]. A recent survey on bilevel programming
for price setting problems is given in [29].
SLP has been applied in smart grid community, e.g., to
the planning of generators’ investments and transmission
network extensions [30], or to the tackling of non-linear
phenomena in variants of the optimal power flow prob-
lem [31]. At the same time, to the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first to apply SLP to tariff optimization for
demand response.
2.4 Positioning of current contribution
This section surveys the literature on game theoretical
models to electricity tariff optimization for DRM and
related problems. The algorithmic techniques applied to
Stackelberg tariff optimization problems are summarized
in a tabular format in Table 1. The survey shows that
although some simpler formulations, all focusing on a
single time period, adopt a solution that can be computed
analytically in closed form, multi-period problems are
computationally more challenging. This observation is also
supported by a formal proof in [32], which states that
multi-period models for DRM with controllable loads at
the consumers are NP-hard. Accordingly, the vast majority
of earlier contributions apply the KKT reformulation to
arrive at a single-level MILP that can be solved using
Table 1 Algorithmic techniques applied for solving Stackelberg tariff optimization models in literature
Paper Game model Time representation Solution approach
[2] Stackelberg game Single period Closed-form analytical solution*
[4, 3] Generalized Nash embedded in Stackelberg Single period Iterative distributed algorithm using KKT & convex optimization
[5] 3-level Stackelberg game Single period Iterative distributed algorithm
[6] Stackelberg game, stochastic Independent
periods**
Closed-form analytical solution
[7] Stackelberg game Multi-period KKT for conversion to single level, MILP
[8] Stackelberg game*** Multi-period KKT for conversion to single level, MILP
[9] Stackelberg game Multi-period Iterative algorithm
[10] Stackelberg game**** Multi-period Iterative algorithm
[11] Stackelberg game Multi-period KKT for conversion to single level, MILP
[23] Stackelberg game Multi-period KKT for conversion to single level, MILP
[13] Stackelberg game Multi-period KKT for conversion to single level, MILP
Note: * denotes that distributed algorithm for achieving the equilibrium is also presented; ** denotes that the multi-period problem can be
reduced to multiple single-period problems; *** denotes that in a 2nd-stage problem, robust optimization is applied to implement the equilibrium
under uncertainty; **** denotes that a Nash game among consumers is also described in the paper.
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commercial solvers. However, at the price of considerable
computational effort, and a number of papers mention that
the solution approach is applicable mostly to small-scale
problems [13]. Other approaches use customized heuristics
for solving the problem.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. On one hand, it
defines a generic game-theoretic model for DRM that slightly
extends the above discussed models (e.g., it captures both
distributed battery storage and controllable loads character-
ized by a given utility function at the consumers). And the key
properties (e.g., necessary conditions for feasibility, compu-
tational complexity) can be formally proven. On the other
hand, it proposes an efficient solution approach based onwell-
established mathematical programming techniques that first
exploits duality for the followers’ model to convert it into a
single-level quadratically constrained quadratic program
(QCQP), and subsequently, applies an SLP approach to solve
it. It is shown in computational experiments that the proposed
approach outperforms earlier KKT-based methods regarding
both solution quality and computational effort for practically
relevant problem sizes.
This paper is a substantially extended version of the
earlier conference paper [33]. In addition to a refined
model that captures the profit-maximizing behavior of the
retailer, the extensions are related to the core contributions
of the present paper, i.e., the formal proofs of the funda-
mental characteristics of the model and the thorough
computational experimentation for assessing solution
quality and computational efficiency.
3 Problem definition
3.1 System architecture
This paper investigates DRM as an interaction among an
electricity retailer and various prosumers, i.e., clients who can
both produce and consume electricity, in a smart grid. In order
to ensure the tractability of the problem over a large popula-
tion, prosumers are classified into prosumer groups (PGs),
where each PG consists of prosumers with similar electricity
consumption and production profiles as well as storage
capabilities. The system architecture is displayed in Fig. 1.
PGs are characterized by their uncontrollable production
and consumption, controllable load requirements as well as
their storage capabilities. The uncontrollable production
Cþi;t and consumption C

i;t of PGi is fixed and given in the
input for each time period t ¼ 1; 2; :::; T . In addition, PGi
needs to schedule a (potentially zero) controllable load of
Mi (Mi is the total controllable load during the horizon)
over the time horizon, where a maximum of Li;t can be
scheduled in each period t. It is noted that time windows
can be defined for the controllable load by setting Li;t ¼ 0
for the appropriate period t. The preferences of PGi on the
timing of the controllable load are encoded in utility values
Ui;t, where Ui;t captures the utility of scheduling a unit of
controllable load in t. Hence, if PGi decides for a con-
trollable load of Li;t over time, this incurs a utility of
PT
t¼1
Ui;tLi;t for the PG. Similar models for controllable load
are used frequently in the literature [8].
PGs can further optimize their energy management by
the appropriate charging and discharging of their battery
storage. The battery is characterized by its capacity Bi, the
maximum charge and discharge rates Rþi and R

i , the initial
battery state-of-charge (SoC) bi;0, and its cycle efficiency
gi. In order to safeguard from unexpected power outages,
the prosumer wishes to retain a given, time-varying mini-
mum SoC Bi;t in the battery.
Each individual PG schedules its controllable load Li;t and
determines its battery SoC bi;t over time to optimize its own
objective, composed of maximizing the utility and mini-
mizing the electricity cost with regard to the energy tariff set
by the retailer. This PG model is generic enough to capture
the behavior of diverse types of prosumers, ranging from
households or offices with uncontrollable consumption only
(and therefore, unresponsive to the energy tariff), via pro-
sumers equipped with renewable energy generation and/or
storage devices, owners of electric vehicles, to complex
microgrid systems. It should be noted that various alternative
approaches for modeling prosumer behavior have been
subjected to extensive research recently. Questions of spe-
cial interest include addressing individual prosumers or
organizing them into PGs as well as using deterministic or
probabilistic models. A richer, probabilistic approach to
characterize the responsiveness of prosumers to the variation
of the electricity tariff is presented in [34], together with a
review of the recent literature on the benefits and drawbacks
of different approaches.
...
Fig. 1 System architecture with a retailer and multiple PGs
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The retailer employs the same time-of-use electricity
tariff for all prosumers. The tariff is specified in the form of
day-ahead electricity purchase prices Qþt and feed-in prices
Qt offered to PGs for periods t ¼ 1; 2; :::; T . It is assumed
that the tariff is regulated by an a priori agreement between
the retailer and the prosumers, which defines minimum,
maximum, and maximum average electricity prices in the
form of 0\QQt Qþt Q and 1T
PT
t¼1
Qþt  ~Q, where ~Q is
max. average electricity price for prosumers; Q is maxi-
mum electricity price for prosumers; Q is minimum elec-
tricity price for prosumers. Such an agreement is necessary
to prevent the profit maximizing retailer from increasing
purchase prices without any limit [7].
The focus of this paper is on the problem faced by the
retailer, who has to cover the (potentially negative) net
consumption of the ensemble of all prosumers from the
electricity purchased or sold on the wholesale market. This
paper assumes a time-variant dual pricing scheme on the
wholesale market, given in the form of purchase prices Pþt
and feed-in prices Pt . It is noted that the same model can be
naturally applied to markets with uniform pricing (purchase
prices equal to selling prices) by letting Pþt ¼ Pt . It is
assumed that the retailer appears as a price-taker on the
market, without any ability to influence the market prices.
By offering an appropriate electricity tariff to its prison-
ers, the retailer can initiate a demand response program that
motivates the prosumers to purchase electricity in valley
periods. When an ample amount of cheap energy is available
on the market, the retailer can sell their surplus energy in
peak periods. In this way, the retailer can contribute to the
grid stability and maximize its profit at the same time. In this
paper, the maximization of the retailer’s profit is addressed.
3.2 Stackelberg game model and its basic
characteristics
The following communication protocol is implemented
among various stakeholders: the retailer firstly announces
the day-ahead electricity tariff to all prosumers. The pro-
sumers observe this tariff and optimize their consumption
profile, i.e., the amount of electricity purchased from or fed
into the grid over time. Then, the parties implement their
actions as planned. It is assumed that the retailer is aware of
the decision model and the parameters of PGs. This leads to
a ‘‘Stackelberg game’’ with the retailer as the ‘‘leader’’ and
PGs as ‘‘multiple followers’’. The so-called ‘‘optimistic’’
assumption is adopted, i.e., if a follower has more than one
optimal solutions according to its own objective, then it
chooses its optimal solution that is the most favorable for the
leader. The following additional assumptions are made,
which guarantee the feasibility of the problem:
XT
t¼1
Li;t Mi 8 i ð1Þ
Bi;t Bi 8 i; t ð2Þ
bi;0 Bi 8 i ð3Þ
bi;0 þ tRþi Bi;t 8 i; t ð4Þ
where T is the number of time periods.
These assumptions require that bounds on the control-
lable load allow schedule the required power over the
horizon as for (1), the bounds on the battery SoC are
consistent as for (2), the initial battery charge satisfies these
bounds as for (3), and finally, that the charging rate of the
battery allows satisfying the lower bounds on the SoC as
for (4).
Lemma 1 (Existence of a solution) If assumptions (1)–
(4) hold, then the followers’ problem is feasible for any
electricity tariff Qþt and Q

t set by the leader.
Proof Setting the battery SoC to the required minimum,
i.e., bi;t ¼ max bi;t1;Bi;t
 
, and scheduling the controllable
as early as the bounds allow, i.e., Li;t ¼
min Li;t;Mi 
Pt1
u¼1
Li;u
 
result in a feasible solution for
each follower i.
Lemma 2 (Independence of followers’ problems) The
optimal demand response of an individual PG to a given
energy tariff is independent of the response of other PGs.
Proof The objectives of the individual PG, i.e., its energy
cost and utility, depend solely on the energy tariff and the
consumption profile of the given PG. Moreover, the fea-
sibility of a consumption profile is also independent of
other PGs’ response, since the amount of electricity that
can be purchased or sold on the market by the retailer to
maintain the grid-level balance is unbounded.
It is emphasized that different PGs’ problems are still
interconnected trough the retailer’s problem, but for any
fixed decision of the retailer on the tariff, the PGs can
optimize their behavior without considering the problems
faced by fellow PGs. Hence, the problem can be modeled
as a Stackelberg game with a single leader (the retailer) and
multiple independent followers (the PGs). It is noted that
when the optimal response of a follower is not unique, the
response induced by the optimistic assumption (from the
set of all optimal responses) can be dependent on other
PGs’ response.
Lemma 3 (Computational complexity) The above defined
bilevel energy tariff optimization problem is NP-hard.
1636 Andra´s KOVA´CS
123
Proof The simple multi-period energy tariff optimization
problem (SMETOP) has been introduced as a minimal
bilevel optimization model of energy tariff optimization for
DRM, and it has been proven to be NP-hard in [32]. The
problem investigated in this paper generalizes SMETOP in
the sense that, in addition to all features captured by
SMETOP, it also handles batteries and uncontrollable
energy production and consumption at the PGs as well as
bidirectional grid connections. This implies that the cur-
rently investigated, generalized problem is NP-hard, too.
4 Solution approach
4.1 Overview
This section presents a bilevel programming formulation
of the above Stackelberg game model, and proposes an
efficient solution approach for that formulation. First, the
models of an individual follower and the leader are for-
mally defined. Then, the bilevel programming model
received as a combination of the two parties’ problems is
reformulated into a single-level QCQP, which is, in turn,
solved using an SLP algorithm.
4.2 Prosumer groups’ (followers’) problem
The decision problem faced by an individual PGi (the
follower) is a parametric optimization problem, whose
parameters encode the electricity tariff determined by the
retailer (decision variables Qþt and Q

t controlled by the
leader). The problem can be captured by the following LP,
where the symbol uki;t on the right-hand side of the con-
straints denotes the dual variables associated with the given
constraint:
min giðQþ;QÞ ¼
XT
t¼1
Qþt x
þ
i;t  Qt xi;t  Ui;tLi;t
 
ð5Þ
s.t.
Cþi;t  Ci;t þ xþi;t  xi;t  Li;t ¼ rþi;t  ri;t 8 t; ½u6i;t
ð6Þ
gi r
þ
i;t  ri;t ¼ bi;t  bi;t1 8 t; ½u7i;t ð7Þ
XT
t¼1
Li;t ¼ Mi ½u8i  ð8Þ
Li;t  Li;t 8 t; ½u9i;t ð9Þ
Bi;t  bi;t 8 t; ½u10i;t  ð10Þ
bi;t Bi 8 t; ½u11i;t  ð11Þ
rþi;t Rþi 8 t; ½u12i;t  ð12Þ
ri;t Ri 8 t; ½u13i;t  ð13Þ
0 xþi;t; xi;t; rþi;t; ri;t; Li;t 8 t ð14Þ
where xþi;t is the electricity purchased; x

i;t is the electricity
fed into the grid; rþi;t is the electricity charged into battery;
ri;t is the electricity discharged from battery; u
k
i;t is the dual
variables.
The follower’s objective (5) is comprised of the total
cost of energy, i.e., the cost of energy purchased minus the
income from feeding energy into the grid, and the PG’s
utility achieved by the timing of the controllable load.
Constraint (6) encodes that the energy balance at the PG is
maintained. Equation (7) computes the battery state-of-
charge based on the charge and discharge rates. Constraints
(8) and (9) ensure that the amount and the timing of the
controllable load satisfies the requirements. Finally,
inequalities (10)–(14) define the allowed range of the bat-
tery SoC, the charge and discharge rates as well as the
electricity purchase and feed-in rates at the PG.
It is noted that all constraints in the followers’ model are
linear, whereas the objective contains the leader’s variables
as multipliers, making it a bilinear (quadratic) expression.
The models of different followers are linked only via the
problem of the leader’s decision.
4.3 Retailer’s (leader’s) problem
The optimization problem faced by the retailer can be
formulated as a bilevel program that contains the PGs’
problem as a nested sub-problem. This nested sub-problem,
encoded as a constraint in the model, expresses that a part
of the variables (decision variables xþi;t and x

i;t, corre-
sponding to the amount of electricity purchased from and
fed into the grid) are controlled by the followers, according
to their known decision model:
max f ¼
XT
t¼1
XN
i¼1
Qþt x
þ
i;t  Qt xi;t
 
 Pþt yþt þ Pt yt
 !
ð15Þ
s.t.
yþt  yt ¼
XN
i¼1
ðxþi;t  xi;tÞ 8 t ð16Þ
QQt Qþt Q 8 t ð17Þ
1
T
XT
t¼1
Qþt  ~Q ð18Þ
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xþi;t
xi;t
 !
2 argmin giðQþ;QÞ j ð6Þ  ð14Þf g 8 i ð19Þ
where N is the number of PGs.
The leader’s objective (15) is to maximize its profit,
calculated as its revenue from the prosumers, minus the
cost of electricity purchased on the market, and plus the
income from the electricity sold on the market. Equa-
tion (16) encodes the grid-level energy balance. Inequali-
ties (17) and (18) define the valid range of the energy tariff
variables. Finally, constraint (19) states that the electricity
purchase and feed-in values of prosumers are determined
using the above optimization model.
4.4 Single-level QCQP reformulation
When the complexity of a bilevel optimization problem
does not allow developing an analytical solution, which is
apparently the case above, the two candidate solution
approaches are the application of (meta-)heuritics directly
to the bilevel problem, or the reformulation to a single-
level problem. The considerable benefit of the latter tech-
nique is that it allows the application of theoretically well-
founded, potentially even exact mathematical program-
ming approaches to solve the problem. For this reason, this
paper adopts the reformulation approach and looks for a
transformation of the bilevel problem (15)–(19) into a
single-level mathematical program. The key to achieve this
is the modeling of the optimality condition of the followers
(19). By exploiting duality for the followers’ LP model it is
noted that the followers’ LP model (5)–(14) contains the
bilinear term Qþt x
þ
i;t  Qt xi;t in the expression of
giðQþ;QÞ, i.e., a multiplication of the leader’s and the
followers’ variables. With this, the model is still linear in
the followers’ variables, and LP duality can be exploited
for reformulating it. By exploiting duality for the follow-
ers’ LP model, primal-dual reformulation of the followers’
problem can be applied: the optimality condition (19) is
translated into the conjunction of followers’ primal con-
straints (6)–(14), dual constraints, and an equality con-
straint between the primal and the dual objectives. By
duality, the ensemble of these constraints is satisfied if and
only if the given instantiation of the variables is an optimal
solution for the follower.
The complete single-level reformulated problem is
shown below. It consists of the leader’s objective (15), the
leader’s constraints (16)–(18), the followers’ primal con-
straints (6)–(14), an equality relation between the follow-
ers’ primal and dual objectives (20) as well as the
followers’ dual constraint corresponding to the primal
variables for the battery charge rate rþi;t (21), discharge rate
ri;t (22), SoC bi;t for t\T (23) and bi;T (24), electricity
purchase xþi;t (25), electricity feed-in x

i;t (26), and control-
lable load Li;t (27).
max f ¼
XT
t¼1
XN
i¼1
Qþt x
þ
i;tQt xi;t
 
 Pþt yþt þ Pt yt
 !
s.t.
ð6Þð14Þ;ð16Þð18Þ
XT
t¼1
Qt x

i;tQþt xþi;tþUi;tLi;t
 
¼
XT
t¼1

Ci;tCþi;t

u6i;tþ Li;tu9i;tþRþi u12i;t
þRi u12i;t Bi;tu10i;t þBiu11i;t

8 i
ð20Þ
u6i;t þ giu7i;t þ u12i;t  0 8 i; t ð21Þ
u6i;t  u7i;t þ u13i;t  0 8 i; t ð22Þ
u7i;t þ u7i;tþ1  u10i;t þ u11i;t  0 8 i; t\T ð23Þ
u7i;T  u10i;T þ u11i;T  0 8 i ð24Þ
u6i;t   Qþt 8 i; t ð25Þ
u6i;t Qt 8 i; t ð26Þ
u6i;t þ u8i þ u9i;t Ui;t 8 i; t ð27Þ
u9i;t; u
10
i;t ; u
11
i;t ; u
12
i;t ; u
13
i;t  0 8 i; t ð28Þ
The primal-dual reformulation particularly suits the prob-
lem in the scope, since the only occurrence of the leader’s
variables, Qþt and Q

t , in the followers’ problem is in their
primal objective, and consequently, on the right hand side
of the dual constraints. As a result, the only non-linear term
in the single-level reformulation is the payment from the
PGs to the retailer, contained both in the leader’s objective
(15) and in the followers’ optimality constraint (20), which
is a bilinear expression containing the multiplication of the
followers’ and the leader’s variables. All other constraints
are linear.
4.5 SLP solution method
Since the above QCQP is non-convex, no efficient exact
algorithm can be expected for solving it, and accordingly,
(meta-)heuristic approaches are of interest. Therefore, we
propose an SLP heuristic solution approach, which shows
good convergence properties especially on problems where
most of the constraints are linear. SLP solves non-linear
problems by iteratively constructing local LP approxima-
tions of the original problem, and solving each approxi-
mation using standard LP techniques [35, 36]. The
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algorithm departs from an initial solution X0, and in each
iteration k, it builds a local linearization of the original
problem around Xk, denoted as LPk. Then, the optimal
solution of LPk is sought subject to a given step bound,
sX  Xk  s. If the optimal LP solution is feasible with
a given tolerance, then it is accepted as the next solution
Xkþ1 (possibly s is increased). Otherwise Xkþ1 ¼ Xk and
s is decreased.
The above SLP algorithm converges to a locally optimal
solution of QCQP, which is potentially different from the
global optimum. In order to reduce the risk of getting stuck
in a local optimum, the SLP algorithm is embedded into a
randomized restart procedure. It executes multiple SLP
runs, using a random perturbation of the previous best
solution as an initial solution in each run (or Qt ¼ Qþt ¼ Q
in the first run). The implementation reported in this paper
is based on the SLP package of Fico Xpress 7.8 by using its
default SLP algorithm, with the number of SLP runs set to
10 in all computational experiments.
4.6 Discussion on possible extensions
While the above presented bilevel model captures the
most important generic features of prosumers (production
and consumption, controllable load, battery storage), it can
be extended and refined in many different ways. The most
relevant directions include the extension of the prosumer
model with features for specific types of equipment that
induce elastic load (e.g., high voltage alternating current
(HVAC) in buildings, or refined battery storage models
capturing state-dependent charging properties and los-
ses [17]) as well as the extension of the retailer model with
the generation or energy storage. The proposed solution
method is directly applicable to the extended models as
long as the prosumer model remains linear. The proposed
reformulation still applies with binary variables in the
retailer model (e.g., due to switchable generators). And
commercial solvers offer algorithms to tackle the resulting
mixed-integer QCQP though the computational efficiency
of the approach which needs to be verified for the given
application.
Below, we review two minor refinements of the baseline
bilevel model (15)–(19) fixing specific issues that might be
undesirable in some application scenarios. Firstly, the
baseline model may trigger inappropriate end-of-horizon
effects, namely, the followers sell all the energy stored in
the batteries to maximize their revenue. This can be avoi-
ded by subtracting a term that valuates the energy stored in
the batteries at the end of the planning horizon from the
followers objective (5) as follows:
QþT þ QT
2
bi;T ð29Þ
Another example of a possible requirement that is not
captured readily by the above model is that, among
different optimal solutions that maximize the retailer’s
profit, a solution with a smooth electricity purchase and/or
sale over time is preferred. Unwanted oscillation of the
energy purchased or sold on the wholesale market can be
smoothed out by adding the following term to the retailer’s
objective:
e
XT
t¼1
ðyþt  yt Þ2 ð30Þ
This quadratic term measures the squared deviation of the
energy traded over time with a constant bias. Accordingly,
adding it to the retailer’s objective with a small multiplier e
smooths unnecessary oscillations without affecting the
payoffs of the players.
4.7 Discussion on KKT reformulation
As an alternative to the proposed solution, KKT refor-
mulation and linearization can be applied to convert the
proposed bilevel model (15)–(19) into a single-level MILP.
This approach is often considered to be the default choice
for transforming bilevel problems into single-level ones.
Moreover, the resulting MILP, in theory, can be solved to
exact optimality by commercial solvers.
Converting the bilevel model into a single-level MILP
requires linearizing the KKT complementary slackness
conditions using big-M constraints over additional binary
variables as well as linearizing the quadratic term in the
objective by expressing and substituting it from (20).
However, as it will be shown in the computational exper-
iments, this approach is computationally challenging due to
the high number of binary variables and big-M constraints.
In particular, linearizing the complementary slackness
conditions requires introducing ca. 22  N T auxiliary
binary variables into the model (one for each primal and
dual variable, resulting in over 20000 additional binary
variables for N ¼ 20 and T ¼ 48). Moreover, the corre-
sponding big-M constraints are typically difficult to solve
due to their weak LP relaxations. For further details on the
KKT reformulation, the interested reader is referred
to [26, 28]. Finally, even minor modifications in the bilevel
model can hinder the linearization of the KKT reformula-
tion, as is the case with terms for the valuation of the
remaining charge (29) or for smoothing (30).
In this paper, we use the KKT reformulation and the
exact MILP solution approach in computational
Bilevel programming approach to demand response management with day-ahead tariff 1639
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experiments to assess the quality of the solutions found by
the proposed SLP solution on small-size problems.
5 Experimental evaluation
5.1 Illustrative example
In this section, the proposed approach to DRM is
demonstrated on a small-scale illustrative example, with
three PGs and a one-day horizon (from 8:00, using hourly
time units). The PGs correspond to different types of
consumers as follows:
1) PG1 represents an intelligent energy-positive street
lighting microgrid system called E?grid [37, 38].
Since the lighting system is controlled according to
local traffic and environmental conditions, as captured
by motion sensors and a local weather station, its
consumption varies dynamically over time. The grid-
connected system is also equipped with photovoltaic
(PV) power generation and battery storage, which
enables it to perform active energy management using
an optimization approach that corresponds to the PG
model adopted in this paper. Real-life data originates
from a physical prototype with 191 luminaries and
151.2 m2 of active PV surface area, and reflects the
operation of the system on a sunny day in October.
The E?grid PG is a net producer (up to 15 kW) during
the day, and a net consumer (up to 3.5 kW) during the
night.
2) PG2 comprises owners of plug-in electric vehicles.
Data used in the example corresponds to three Nissan
Leaf electric vehicles, with a 24 kWh battery pack in
each vehicle, which has to be charged from a 50%
state to 100% state during the night. Individual
vehicles are connected to the grid between 17:00 and
20:00 and disconnected between 6:00 and 8:00 in the
morning. With the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) option
ignored, this can be modeled as a controllable load
of 36 kWh. It is assumed that the owners have a slight
preference for charging the electric vehicles as early as
possible, which is captured by utility values U2;t
linearly decreasing over time.
3) Finally, PG3 contains households with uncontrollable
consumption only. This case study uses the data of 15
average Hungarian homes, with a peak consumption of
5.7 kW during the day, and a minimum consumption
of 3.8 kW during the night. Since this PG has no
controllable load or battery storage, it cannot partic-
ipate actively in DRM, and its consumption appears
only as a time-varying bias in the grid-level
consumption.
The retailer aims to maximize its profit by offering an
appropriate time-of-use electricity tariff to the PGs,
respecting a priori contract that sets Q ¼ 1 c/kWh, Q ¼
100 c/kWh, and ~Q ¼ 10 c/kWh. For the sake of simplicity,
the wholesale market prices are assumed to vary in two
steps: 12 c/kWh during the day (between 8:00 and 21:00)
and 6 c/kWh during the night. The feed-in price on the
wholesale market is a constant 3 c/kWh.
The system-level optimum for this example is deter-
mined by the following characteristics: the overall grid is a
net producer until 17:00 due to PV generation in the E?-
grid microgrid, whereas it is a net consumer afterwards. In
order to avoid losses stemming from dual pricing on the
wholesale market, the retailer should motivate the PGs to
anticipate load and charge batteries before 17:00. On the
contrary, in the period after 17:00, it should encourage PGs
to defer their load from the peak period lasting until 21:00
to the valley period afterwards.
This sample instance was solved using the proposed
approach, applying formula (30) to eliminate the oscilla-
tions of the energy flow that are visually disturbing.
Otherwise, it does not affect the payoffs of the players. The
results displayed in Figs. 2, 3, 4, and 5 show that the
proposed approach could indeed reach the above described
system-level optimum. The diagrams compare the opti-
mized consumption profile (red curve) to the baseline
consumption (green curve) for the overall grid and for the
individual PGs, where the baseline consumption is com-
puted by scheduling the controllable loads to maximize
utility (ignoring the electricity tariff) without using the
batteries. The characteristic time periods are separated by
dashed lines at 17:00 and 21:00. Finally, the optimized
purchase tariff is also shown in the diagram of the overall
grid: constant low prices (1 cent/kWh) are applied while
the system is a net producer until 17:00, whereas high,
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Fig. 2 Solution with optimized tariff: energy purchase price and
overall consumption over time
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slightly decreasing prices are used afterwards (15.74 cent/
kWh at 18:00, decreasing by 0.05 cent/kWh per hour).
On the level of individual PGs, the applied tariff moti-
vated the E?grid PG to charge its battery while it is a net
producer, to reach a fully charged state during
14:00–17:00, and to gradually discharge the battery in the
rest of the peak period between 17:00 and 21:00. The
controllable load of the EV PG was fully deferred to the
valley period after 21:00. In that period, the slight decrease
of the purchase prices over time compensated the PG for its
linearly decreasing utility function, Therefore, an arbitrary
scheduling of the controllable load became optimal for this
PG. There were no controllable variables for the household
PG. This tariff and consumption profile are globally opti-
mal for the retailer, since no further load can be moved
outside the peak period between 17:00 and 21:00.
With 10 SLP runs within the randomized restart
heuristic, the implementation of the proposed solution
approach in Fico Xpress 7.8 could solve the above problem
instance in 9.8 seconds on a computer with Intel i7 2.70
GHz CPU and 16 GB RAM.
5.2 Computational experiments
The evaluation of the proposed approach in computa-
tional experiments focuses on two questions:  the com-
putational effort required by the proposed SLP solution; `
the quality of the solutions found. Large problem instances
are generated by the multiplication and random perturba-
tion of the data used in the above illustrative example.
Table 2 displays the average computation time in seconds
over 10 instances for different combinations of N (number
of PGs) and T (number of time periods), which are
achieved with the proposed model (15)–(19) and the
algorithm using 10 SLP runs. The results show that the
computation time increases moderately with problem size,
and practically relevant problem sizes, e.g., with N ¼ 20
and T ¼ 48, are tractable in a reasonable amount of time.
In applications where a different tradeoff between solution
quality and computation time is looked for, the algorithm
can be tuned by modifying the number of SLP runs.
In order to evaluate the quality of the solutions found by
the proposed approach, they are compared to the exact
optimal solutions of the MILP model received by applying
KKT reformulation and linearization as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.7. The results of the comparison are displayed in
Table 3, which displays aggregated results over 10
instances for each problem size. The column of Opt. (short
for optimality) contains the ratio of instances that could be
solved to prove the optimality using KKT, and the column
of Time shows the average computation time required for
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Table 2 Average computation time in seconds by problem size for
proposed SLP solution
N T ¼ 12 T ¼ 24 T ¼ 36 T ¼ 48
5 0.55 1.46 2.22 16.04
10 1.10 73.38 57.97 228.37
15 1.67 155.74 51.59 283.56
20 3.63 257.31 98.82 345.06
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this. The branch and bound search are aborted when the
time limit of 600 s is hit, and the best integer solution found
is recorded. The columns of Min., Avg., and Max display
the minimum, the average, and the maximum gap between
the SLP and the KKT solutions for the given problem size.
Finally, the column of Time contains the average compu-
tation time for the SLP solution. The results show that the
smallest instances, with N ¼ 3, could be solved to prove
the optimality using KKT with a single exception.
Although SLP is not an exact solution approach, in practice
it also builds close-to-optimal solutions with an average
gap of only 0.01%–0.1%. For larger instances N ¼ 5,
where KKT failes to find the optimal solution, SLP often
constructs significantly better solutions, as indicated by
negative gap values. Namely, SLP finds up to 40% better
solutions than KKT with one or two orders of magnitude
lower computation times.
Hence, it can be concluded that although KKT is an
exact solution in theory, its applicability is limited to small
problems, e.g., with N ¼ 3. In contrast, the proposed pri-
mal-dual reformulation couples with SLP scales much
more favorably, and it computes high-quality solutions
efficiently even for practically relevant problem sizes.
6 Conclusion
This paper introduces a bilevel programming approach to
energy tariff optimization for DRM in smart grids. In the
Stackelberg game model, the leader is a profit maximizing
retailer, who sets the energy tariff offered to its prosumers and
purchases electricity for them from thewholesalemarket. The
prosumers, who act as multiple independent followers, opti-
mize their controllable load and their battery charging
schedule to maximize their utility and minimize their cost of
energy. A new solution is introduced, which exploits the pri-
mal-dual reformulation of the followers’ problem to arrive at a
single-level QCQP equivalent of the bilevel problem. It has
been shown that the resulting QCQP can be solved efficiently
using an SLP algorithm. In particular, it is illustrated in
computational experiments that the proposed approach out-
performs the technique based on the KKT reformulation,
which is the dominant approach for solving similar problems
in the literature.Hence, themain contributions of the paper are
a bilevel programming formulation of the tariff optimization
problem, formal proofs of some basic properties, and the
application of new and efficient mathematical programming
techniques to solve this problem.
The proposed model can be trivially extended to some
more complex problems, e.g., with various types of con-
trollable loads and storage devices for each PG, or
switchable generators and energy storage at the retailer. A
more important and challenging direction for future
research is the investigation of richer, non-linear prosumer
models that can capture more realistically, e.g., thermal
processes of HVAC in buildings or charging properties of
batteries. The extension to a stochastic variant, accounting
for uncertainties in consumption, production, and spot
market prices is also of interest.
Finally, it must be observed that while Stackelberg game
models are becoming ubiquitous in the literature of DRM,
a critical pre-condition of their practical applicability is
that the leader should be able to identify the decision
models and parameters. This is a challenging problem in
application scenarios characterized by information asym-
metry. A promising solution can be the application of
inverse optimization, analogously to a case in inventory
control [39]. With historical pairs of a follower’s input
(i.e., energy tariff) and response (consumption), the inverse
optimization approach looks for parameters which ensure
that each response is optimal for the corresponding input.
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